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Prologue
For	Bhartṛhari,	a	fifth-century	philosopher	of	the	Indian	Grammarian	(Vaiyākaraṇika)	
school,	all	conscious	beings	—	beasts,	birds	and	humans	—	are	capable	of	what	he	
called	pratibhā,	a	flash	of	indescribable	intuitive	understanding	such	that	one	knows	
what	the	present	object	“means”	and	what	to	do	with	it.	Contemporary	scholars	writ-
ing	on	pratibhā	generally	translate	the	Sanskrit	term	as	“intuition,”	not	in	the	sense	
understood	by	many	analytical	philosophers	 as	 an	a	priori	 judgment	 appealed	 to	
in	thought	experiments	to	test	philosophical	hypotheses,	but	in	the	sense	of	a	spon-
taneously	arising	awareness	that	is	immediate,	reliable,	indescribable,	and	pregnant	
with	meaning.	Significantly,	our	instantaneous	understanding	of	a	sentence	or	com-
plete	utterance	already	counts	as	an	instance	of	pratibhā.	Given	that	to	understand	a	
sentence	 is	 to	know	 its	meaning,	 such	an	understanding,	 if	correct,	amounts	 to	a	
mode	of	knowing	that	may	best	be	termed	knowing-what,	to	distinguish	it	from	both	
knowing-that	and	knowing-how.
This	essay	attempts	to	expound	Bhartṛhari’s	conception	of	pratibhā	in	relation	to	
the	notions	of	meaning,	understanding,	and	knowing	laid	out	in	his	magnum	opus,	
the	Vākyapadīya	(henceforth	VP ).1	The	conception	is	philosophically	intriguing	and	
contemporarily	relevant.	Yet,	it	has	not	hitherto	been	subjected	to	a	systematic	ana-
lytical	philosophical	treatment.2	Here,	I	hope	to	fill	this	lacuna.
Now,	 to	 offer	 a	 broadly	 coherent	 and	 focused	 philosophical	 analysis,	 I	 shall	
	neglect	 the	 metaphysical	 and	 presumably	 exotic	 aspects	 of	 the	 conception.	 My	
	overall	 purpose	 is	 to	 provide	 a	 rational	 reconstruction	 of	 Bhartṛhari’s	 empirical	
thought	 on	 pratibhā	 to	 suggest	 its	 relevance	 for	 contemporary	 studies	 of	 related	
	topics.
I	identify	three	different	yet	interrelated	notions	of	pratibhā:	intuitive	meaning,	
intuitive	understanding,	and	knowing-what.	The	remainder	of	 the	essay	deals	with	
each	 in	 turn.	 In	“Intuitive	Meaning,”	 I	 touch	briefly	on	Bhartṛhari’s	views	of	con-
sciousness	and	language,	and	examine	at	some	length	his	indescribability	thesis	con-
cerning	the	intuitive	meaning	of	a	sentence.	In	“Intuitive	Understanding,”	I	delineate	
the	general	features	of	pratibhā	as	intuitive	understanding	and	discuss	its	probable	
range	in	relation	to	expert	intuition	and	sense	perception.	Thereafter,	in	“Knowing-
what,”	 I	 relate	pratibhā	 to	 the	 notion	 of	 knowing-what	 and	 show	why	 these	 two	
	notions	 are	 to	 be	 differentiated	 from	 knowing-that	 and	 knowing-how.	 I	 conclude	
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with	 some	 remarks	 on	 the	 contemporary	 relevance	 of	 Bhartṛhari’s	 conception	 of	
pratibhā.
Intuitive Meaning
Bhartṛhari’s	philosophy	affirms	the	omnipresent	and	world-constituting	character	of	
language	while	revealing	holistic	and	monistic	tones.	He	is	well	known	for	claiming	
that	all	awareness	appears	as	if	permeated	by	words.	It	is	by	dint	of	words	that	con-
sciousness	is	capable	of	illuminating	its	object,	that	one	is	able	to	grasp	distinctions	
among	things.	Meanwhile,	Bhartṛhari	has	a	holistic	preference	for	that	which	is	con-
ceptually	undifferentiated;	for	him,	a	whole	is	typically	more	real	than	its	parts.	He	
goes	on,	it	seems,	to	posit	an	undivided	and	linguistic	reality	as	the	ultimate	source	
of	myriad	 things	 in	 the	world.3	However,	 I	 shall	not	discuss	such	metaphysical	or	
quasi-metaphysical	aspects	of	his	philosophy,	but	will	confine	my	discussion	to	the	
generally	empirical	dimension.
Equally	unmistakable	 is	 the	 fact	 that	 for	Bhartṛhari	 the	nature	and	 functioning	
of	language	is	closely	interlinked	with	that	of	consciousness.	A	perceptual	awareness	
or	an	episode	of	perceptual	consciousness	consists	of	the	act	of	perception	and	the	
immanently	known	form	of	its	external	object.	Let	us	call	such	a	form	a	percept.	For	
example,	when	I	see	a	gray	treepie	bird,	there	would	appear	in	my	consciousness	a	
gray-treepie	percept,	which	results	from	it	having	being	illuminated	and	assimilated	
by	 the	consciousness.4	 In	Bhartṛhari’s	view,	 further,	consciousness	 is	self-aware	 in	
that	both	the	act	and	the	percept	are	instantaneously	and	immanently	known	to	con-
sciousness	itself.	In	perception,	one	is	aware	of	both	the	perceptual	act	and	the	inten-
tional	percept.5	Similarly,	in	understanding	a	word,	one	is	aware	of	both	the	signifying	
word	and	its	signified	meaning.6	Here,	Bhartṛhari	takes	the	meaning	(artha)	of	a	word	
like	 “treepie”	 to	be	an	 immanent	 intentional	object	 (buddhiviṣaya) — basically	 the	
form	or	image	appearing	in	the	awareness	of	understanding	the	word	—	which	has	as	
its	ground	an	external	object	and	is	externally	imposed.7	For	him,	the	understanding	
can	occur	even	if	no	concerned	external	object	is	present.
For	Bhartṛhari,	the	primary	meaningful	unit	of	language	is	the	sentence,	not	the	
word.	Only	a	sentence	or	complete	utterance	conveys	a	clear	and	complete	meaning	
and	prompts	the	hearer	to	action.	Words,	by	contrast,	express	their	meanings	only	in	
the	context	of	a	sentence.	 In	 fact,	Bhartṛhari	would	 tend	 to	view	the	meanings	of	
words	in	isolation	as	imaginary	constructs.	Consequently,	he	normally	uses	the	term	
pratibhā	to	represent	the	instantaneous	understanding	of	a	sentence	and	the	correla-
tive	sentence	meaning,	but	not	word	understanding	and	word	meaning.	Significantly,	
the	sentence	meaning	is	also	mental,	or,	we	may	say,	intentionally	immanent	in	char-
acter.8	Additionally,	the	percept	and	the	sentence	meaning	are	alike	in	that	they	both	
figure	as	gestalt-like	wholes	that	cannot	be	reduced	to	a	mere	aggregation	of	their	
constituents.	Let	us	now	focus	on	the	notion	of	sentence	meaning	as	an	instance	of	
pratibhā.
With	Bhartṛhari’s	emphasis	on	linguistic	practice	and	consciousness,	the	notion	
of	sentence	meaning	discussed	here	is	not	the	conventional	or	semantic	meaning	of	
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a	sentence,	but	what	the	hearer	intentionally	apprehends	at	the	precise	moment	she	
understands	a	complete	utterance.	In	the	process	of	comprehending	a	sentence,	we	
typically	apprehend	its	constituent	words	and	their	indefinite	meanings	individually	
and	sequentially.	Toward	the	end	of	the	process,	according	to	Bhartṛhari,	a	distinct	
sentence	meaning	as	pratibhā	may	appear	in	a	flash,	brought	forth	by	the	word	mean-
ings.	Let	us	term	such	a	meaning	intuitive meaning,	using	the	adjective	“intuitive”	to	
capture	the	immediate,	holistic,	and	somehow	indescribable	character	of	the	mean-
ing.	Here	is	how	Bhartṛhari	characterizes	it	in	the	VP	:	9
It	 [i.e.,	 the	 intuitive	meaning]	cannot	be	explained	 to	others	as	 “it	 is	 this.”	Though	 its	
	existence	is	borne	out	by	one’s	own	experiential	activity,	even	the	agent	herself	cannot	
render	a	description	of	it.	(2.144)	While	being	beyond	analytical	reflection,	it	seems	to	
complete	the	combination	of	the	word	meanings	and	assume,	as	it	were,	the	whole	form	
[covering	all	the	meanings].	It	figures	as	an	object.	(2.145)
Upon	hearing	a	sentence	that	is	understood,	an	intuitive	meaning	spontaneously	oc-
curs	as	the	intentional	correlate	of	the	act	of	sentence	understanding	and	is	imma-
nently	and	distinctively	known	or	experienced	by	the	hearer.	This	fact	shows	itself	in	
the	hearer’s	knowing	what	to	do	in	response	to	the	sentence.
For	Bhartṛhari,	one	can	directly	and	instantly	experience	the	intuitive	meaning	of	
a	sentence,	which,	we	may	say,	approximates	what it is like to	understand	what	the	
sentence	means.10	While	probably	many	would	concede	that	upon	understanding	a	
sentence	a	somewhat	unitary	meaning	or	sense	appears	and	is	experienced	in	con-
sciousness,	what	is	remarkable	here	is	Bhartṛhari’s	view	that	the	intuitive	meaning	
cannot	be	properly	verbalized.	He	sees	a	limit	of	language	right	in	linguistic	under-
standing!	We	may	ascribe	to	him	the	following	Indescribability	Thesis:	that	the	in-
tuitive	meaning	 that	 is	directly	experienced	 in	 linguistic	understanding	cannot	be	
adequately	expressed	as	it	truly	is	by	words.	Significantly,	the	indescribability	does	
not	arise	because	the	meaning	is	unique	and	private	to	every	individual.	The	meaning	
is	as	ineffable	to	oneself	as	it	is	incommunicable	to	others.	Bhartṛhari	does	not	posit	
any	kind	of	private	language	to	address	the	problem.
If	someone	does	not	know	what	it	is	like	to	see	lavender,	we	can	hardly	describe	
to	him	what	seeing	the	color	is	like.	We	may	just	show	it	by	inducing	in	him	a	visual	
experience	of	the	color.	Similarly,	if	one	is	ignorant	of	what	it	is	like	to	understand	
what	is	meant	by	the	sentence	“Lavender	is	extensively	used	in	aromatherapy,”	we	
may	make	sure	he	understands	the	meaning	of	the	words	concerned	and	then	induce	
in	him	the	relevant	experience	of	sentence	understanding.	It	is	not	easy	to	put	ade-
quately	into	words	the	experienced	(intuitive)	meaning.11	Bhartṛhari	could	be	hinting	
at	this	when,	in	VP	2.421–422,	he	explains	the	difference	between	the	particularized	
experience	of	sentence	meaning	and	the	indefinite	apprehension	of	word	meaning	
by	referring	to	that	between	the	actual	experience	of	being	burnt	and	the	mere	ap-
prehension	of	the	meaning	of	the	word	“burn.”	In	any	case,	I	detect	in	the	VP	three	
interrelated	reasons	for	the	indescribability	thesis,	to	which	we	shall	now	attend.
To	state	the	first	reason:	for	Bhartṛhari,	intuitive	meaning	is	of	the	nature	of	inter-
relation	between	word	meanings,	while	a	relation	in	itself	cannot	be	described.	A	
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relation	 is	 not	 determinately	 cognizable;	 it	 lacks	 an	 independent	 form	 on	which	
words	can	alight,	because	it	depends	entirely	on	the	items	that	are	related	by	it.12	In	
addition,	given	the	entity-like	nature	of	nouns,	any	noun	used	to	signify	the	relation	
inevitably	 turns	 it	 into	 an	 entity	 that	 possesses	 a	 relation,	 but	 not	 the	 relation	 as	
such.13	We	then	reformulate	the	reason	as	the	following	argument:
	A1.	The	intuitive	meaning	of	a	sentence	is	of	the	nature	of	a	relation,	because	it	
knits	together	the	meanings	of	the	words	that	constitute	the	sentence.
	A2.	A	relation	is	indescribable,	for	it	is	indeterminate	and	cannot	be	expressed	
without	being	turned	into	a	relatum.
	A3.	Hence,	the	intuitive	meaning	is	indescribable	in	words.
In	an	essay	that	touches	upon	the	issue	of	ineffability,	it	is	advisable	here	to	ex-
plain	the	sense	in	which	words	can	be	said	to	directly	and	properly	express,	that	is,	
to	describe,	their	objects.	Broadly	following	Bhartṛhari,	we	may	take	the	semantic	
object	of	a	word,	that	is,	that	which	is	directly	and	properly	expressed	by	a	word,	to	
be	what	the	word	is	invariably	and	referentially	connected	to	in	each	of	its	literal	uses	
in	a	sentence	and	when	it	is	used	with	the	same	meaning.	The	semantic	correlate	of	
words	that	form	a	sentence	can	be	understood	mutatis mutandis.	Now,	words	that	
form	a	sentence	directly	and	properly	express	a	thing	if	and	only	if	their	semantic	
correlate	conforms	to	the	thing.	If	the	correlate	does	not	conform	to	the	thing,	then	
the	words	fail	to	describe	it.	A	Christian	theologian,	for	example,	may	consider	God	
ineffable	on	the	ground	that	the	subject-predicate	form	of	the	language	that	we	use	
connotes	a	semantic	correlate	that	represents	a	division	between	a	substance	and	its	
attributes,	yet	God	is	altogether	one	and	simple	in	Himself.	The	semantic	correlate	of	
language	is	structured,	with	distinctions	due	to	word	meanings,	yet	the	Deity	is	taken	
to	be	void	of	division	and	structure.
Language	operates	in	the	realms	of	generality	or	semblance,	and	the	sentential	
form	of	language,	together	with	the	distinctions	due	to	word	meanings,	indicates	that	
the	semantic	correlate	of	a	sentence	 is	structured	and	does	not	conform	to	 things	
that	are	devoid	of	division	and	structure.	Thus,	Bhartṛhari	is	of	the	view	that	an	item	
that	is	devoid	of	division	and	structure,	and	so	lacks	a	distinct	basis	for	the	applica-
tion	of	words,	is	indescribable	in	itself.14	With	regard	to	our	case,	the	sentence	“The	
sky	is	clear”	may	express	a	semantic	correlate	composed	of	distinct	relata,	whereas	
the	intuitive	meaning	known	from	the	sentence	is	an	interrelation	of	the	form,	say,	of	
“the-sky-is-clear.”	The	correlate	does	not	conform	to	the	meaning.	Hence,	the	inde-
scribability	thesis	follows.15
One	may,	of	course,	have	doubts	about	premise	A1.	However,	Bhartṛhari	also	
contends	 that	 an	 intuitive	 meaning	 is	 divisionless	 and	 sequenceless,	 which	 may	
count	 as	 the	 second	 reason	 for	 the	 thesis.	 Even	 though	 the	meaning	 results	 from	
the	 combination	 of	 word	 meanings,	 it	 is	 actually	 a	 unitary,	 structureless	 whole	
that	 is	 beyond	 analytical	 reflection.16	 It	 cannot	 be	 put	 into	 words,	 for	 the	 mere	
	combination	of	word	meanings	entails	a	structure	that	fails	to	conform	to	it.	Here	is	
the	argument:
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	B1.	The	intuitive	meaning	of	a	sentence	is	a	unitary,	structureless	whole	that	can-
not	be	analyzed	and	reduced	to	the	mere	combination	of	word	meanings.
	B2.	Any	sentence	used	to	express	the	meaning	invariably	connotes	a	semantic	
structure	that	fails	to	conform	to	it.
	B3.	Hence,	the	intuitive	meaning	is	indescribable	in	words.
Again,	one	may	question	the	tenability	of	premise	B1.	How	can	a	sentence	meaning	
that	arises	out	of	distinct	word	meanings	be	without	division?	Let	us	then	consider	the	
third	reason	for	holding	the	indescribability	thesis,	which	concerns	the	irreducibility	
of	an	effect	to	its	causes.	For	Bhartṛhari,	an	effect	arises	spontaneously	and	distinctly	
from	a	set	of	causal	factors	and	is	not	related	to	them	in	a	definite	manner.	The	effect	
as	a	unitary,	previously	non-existent	item	is	said	to	come	into	existence	by	a	wonder-
ful	process	—	one	may	think	of	the	intoxicating	power	of	wine	in	relation	to	its	causal	
materials.	As	a	result,	its	nature	cannot	be	described	and	properly	revealed	by	refer-
ence	to	its	causal	factors.
In	understanding	a	sentence,	we	sequentially	apprehend	its	constituent	words	
and	their	meanings,	and	the	meanings	may	leave	in	our	subliminal	consciousness	
their	 residual	 traces,	 which	 finally	 help	 to	 bring	 forth	 the	 intuitive	meaning.	The	
meaning,	which	figures	as	an	undifferentiated	gestalt,	even	though	it	depends	caus-
ally	on	the	vaguely	known	word	meanings,	is	far	more	than	their	mere	conglomera-
tion.	It	results	from	the	interrelating	of	the	word	meanings	in	such	a	way	that	it	does	
not	 reside	 in	any	of	 the	meanings	 taken	 singly	or	collectively,	and	cannot	be	de-
scribed	by	reference	to	them.17	Given	the	foregoing,	we	may	formulate	the	following	
argument:
	C1.	An	effect	that	arises	from	a	set	of	causal	factors	is	irreducible	to	a	mere	con-
glomeration	of	the	factors	and	cannot	be	described	by	reference	to	them.
	C2.	The	intuitive	meaning	of	a	sentence	is	an	effect	that	arises	from	the	meanings	
of	its	constituent	words.
	C3.	Hence,	the	intuitive	meaning	cannot	be	described	in	reference	to	the	word	
meanings.
In	daily	linguistic	practice,	we	may	analyze	a	sentence	meaning	based	on	the	word	
meanings.	Yet,	this	is	only	an	expedient	measure	for	better	understanding	the	sen-
tence.	The	intuitive	meaning	of	the	sentence	“The	sky	is	clear,”	being	a	distinct	effect,	
cannot	be	revealed	as	it	truly	is	by	a	mere	juxtaposition	of	the	words	“the,”	“sky,”	
“is,”	and	“clear.”	Appeal	to	other	words	surely	cannot	do	any	better.
We	seem	to	be	facing	a	paradox:	the	intuitive	meaning	that	is	known	by	under-
standing	a	sentence	cannot	be	described	by	the	sentence	itself.	However,	this	only	
indicates	that	the	experientially	known	meaning	of	a	sentence	differs	distinctly	from	
the	abstractly	considered	semantic	meaning	of	the	same	sentence,	the	latter	being	
the	semantic	correlate	of	the	sentence.	Put	conceptually,	but	not	linguistically,	the	
correlate	would	be	replaced	by	a	propositional,	structured	thought	that	consists	of	
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compositionally	combined	concepts.	Still,	such	a	thought	is	no	match	for	the	intui-
tive	meaning.
Nevertheless,	Bhartṛhari	must	have	overemphasized	the	distinct,	undifferentiated	
character	of	the	intuitive	meaning.	VP	2.145,	quoted	above,	implies	that	the	intui-
tive	meaning	seemingly	comprises	within	itself	all	the	word	meanings.	Indeed,	the	
word	meanings	as	cooperating	factors	for	the	intuitive	meaning	occur	both	before	
and	simultaneously	with	the	meaning.	After	the	sequentially	and	indefinitely	appre-
hended	word	meanings	give	rise	to	the	intuitive	meaning,	the	latter,	while	making	the	
meanings	less	indefinite,	is	intertwined	with,	and	somewhat	differentiated	by	them.	
If	so,	the	meaning	is	not	as	divisionless	as	Bhartṛhari	would	like	to	take	it	to	be,	and	
may	 instead	 be	 endowed	with	 a	 texture	 of	 interrelated	word	meanings	 such	 that	
the	indescribability	thesis	should	only	be	taken	with	a	pinch	of	salt.	Still,	this	obser-
vation	does	not	necessarily	invalidate	the	thesis,	which	should	remain	worthy	of	our	
consideration.
It	is	worthwhile	at	this	point	to	turn	to	Michael	Polanyi’s	theory	of	tacit	knowing	
for	further	elucidation.	For	Polanyi,	every	object-directed	awareness	has	a	tacit,	inar-
ticulate	root.	In	wielding	a	hammer	to	drive	a	nail,	for	example,	one	watches	the	ef-
fects	of	the	strokes	on	the	nail	and	is	also	aware	of	the	feelings	in	the	hand	that	is	
holding	the	hammer,	which	guide	one’s	handling	of	it	effectively.	Yet	the	feelings	are	
not	attended	to	in	the	way	that	one	attends	to	the	effects.	Here,	one	knows	the	feel-
ings	only	by	relying	on	them	for	attending	to	the	hammer	hitting	the	nail,	and	so	one	
has	only	what	Polanyi	calls	subsidiary	awareness	of	the	feelings,	which,	we	may	say,	
is	merged	into	one’s	focal	awareness	of	driving	the	nail.18	Likewise,	in	many	other	
conscious	activities,	one	focally	attends	to	a	coherent	item	that	emerges	from	one’s	
integrating	various	assisting	factors,	which	are	called	subsidiaries,	of	which,	as	a	re-
sult	of	such	integration,	one	becomes	only	tacitly	and	subsidiarily	aware.	Often,	one	
first	needs	 to	attend	 to	 the	subsidiaries	 focally.	 If	one	 is	 skillful	or	knowledgeable	
enough	to	perform	the	integration,	one	then	integrates	the	subsidiaries	to	attend	to	
the	emerging	focus,	which,	interestingly,	is	said	to	be	their	meaning	or	joint	signifi-
cance.	Meanwhile,	if	one	turns	one’s	attention	back	to	(some	of	)	the	subsidiaries,	the	
latter	become	 the	 foci	while	being	deprived	of	 their	meaning	 just	as	 the	previous	
focus	is	relinquished.
Polanyi	applies	his	 theory	 to	various	 fields,	 including	 linguistic	practice.	“The	
most	 pregnant	 carriers	 of	meaning,”	 says	 he,	 “are	 of	 course	 the	words	 of	 a	 lan-
guage.”19	We	may	say	that	when	one	hears	a	series	of	audible	words	that	constitute	
an	utterance,	one	integrates	the	words	and	their	meanings	in	order	to	attend	focally	
to	the	meaning	of	the	utterance.	At	the	end	of	this	process,	one	is	only	tacitly	aware	
of	the	word	meanings.	Similarly,	for	Bhartṛhari,	in	understanding	a	word	in	a		sentence,	
one	first	attends	to	its	sound	and	apprehends	its	true	form	as	a	signifier;	then	the	word	
becomes	a	remainder,	secondary	to	the	now-attended	meaning.	Likewise,	in	under-
standing	 the	 sentence,	 the	 word	 meanings,	 after	 being	 known	 sequentially	 and	
vaguely,	fuse	together	with	the	result	that	the	meaning	of	the	sentence	distinctly	ap-
pears	in	a	flash.	Bhartṛhari	agrees	that	when	the	sentence	meaning	is	obscure,	one	
410	 Philosophy	East	&	West
may	re-attend	to	some	of	the	constituent	words	in	order	to	have	a	re-fusion	of	the	
word	meanings	that	results	in	the	appearing	of	a	clear	sentence	meaning.
By	“tacit	knowing,”	Polanyi	mainly	means	the	act	of	knowing	involved	in	one’s	
tacitly	integrating	the	subsidiaries	into	the	coherent	focal	entity	as	their	joint	mean-
ing.	One	point	of	his	theory	of	tacit	knowing	is	that	the	product	of	a	tacit	integra-
tion	cannot	be	reduced	to	a	mere	summation	of	its	detectable	subsidiaries.	This	is	
also	what	Bhartṛhari	 is	 driving	 at	when	he	 speaks	 of	 intuitive	meaning	being	be-
yond	 	analytical	 reflection.	However,	while	 Bhartṛhari	 stresses	 the	 indescribability	
of	 the	meaning,	Polanyi	highlights	 the	unspecifiability	of	 the	 subsidiaries	 and	 the	
ineffability	of	their	tacit	knowledge.20	Still,	given	that	in	many	cases	the	focal	entity	
is	formed	jointly	by	the	subsidiaries,	the	latter’s	unspecifiability	and	the	ineffability	of	
the	relation	between	them	make	it	hard	to	describe	the	entity	adequately.21	In	any	
case,	 Polanyi’s	 notion	of	 tacit	 integration	 and	his	 claim	 that	we know more  than 
we can say may	help	 in	elucidating	and	strengthening	Bhartṛhari’s	 ideas	on	 intui-
tive	meaning	and	understanding.	We	also	note	his	view	to	the	effect	that	all	kinds	
of	 rational	 knowing	 involve	 the	knower’s	 existential	participation	and	are	 shaped	
and	sustained	by	certain	inarticulate	mental	faculties	that	we	share	with	nonhuman	
animals.
Intuitive Understanding
It	is	no	coincidence	that,	for	Bhartṛhari,	the	term	pratibhā	stands	for	sentence	under-
standing	as	well	as	sentence	meaning.	The	intuitive	meaning	qua	sentence	meaning,	
being	the	inner	intentional	object	of	an	understanding	act,	is	immanent	in	the	aware-
ness	 of	 sentence	 understanding,	 whereas	 the	 awareness,	 comprising	 within	 itself	
both	the	act	and	the	meaning,	is	said	to	be	a	unitary,	indivisible	whole.	It	is	through	
conceptual	analysis	that	we	hold	the	act	and	the	meaning	apart.22	Here,	a	sentence	
understanding	is	a	spontaneously	arising,	unitary	awareness	that	comprises	both	the	
act	and	the	meaning,	and	the	previously	mentioned	indescribability	of	the	meaning	
can	readily	be	extended	to	that	of	the	understanding.
Significantly,	sentence	understanding	is	only	a	paradigmatic	case	for	Bhartṛhari’s	
notion	of	pratibhā	 as	a	 flash	of	 indescribable	understanding	 such	 that	one	knows	
what	the	present	object	means	and	what	to	do	with	it.	Let	us	use	the	term	“intuitive	
understanding”	 or	 simply	 “intuition”	 for	 this	 notion.23	The	 notion	 can	 be	 applied	
across	a	wide	range,	although	it	is	difficult	to	ascertain	precisely	what	that	range	is.	
For	our	purposes,	and	on	the	basis	of	my	reading	of	the	passages	in	the	VP	that	con-
cern	 the	 notion,	 let	 us	 first	 delineate	 the	 general	 features	 of	pratibhā	 as	 intuitive	
	understanding:	 (1)	 it	cannot	be	adequately	described,	given	mainly	 the	 indescrib-
ability	of	its	intentional	content;24	(2)	it	arises	spontaneously	in	a	flash,	following	a	
tacit	integration	that	involves	the	presence	of	words	or	linguistic	traces	(śabdabhāvanā)	
and	depends	on	repeated	practice	or	nature/instinct,	such	that	it	cannot	be	reduced	
to	a	mere	summation	of	its	causal	factors	and	constituents;	 (3)	 it	 is	an	immediate,	
noninferential	awareness	of	an	object	for	what	it	“means”	as	well	as	of	what	to	do	
with	it,	and	is	generally	considered	reliable	concerning	what	it	reveals;	and	(4)	its	
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content	cannot	be	 transmitted	 to	others	—	everyone	has	 to	acquire	 it	 through	 their	
own	practices	and	experiences.	The	 last	 three	 features	will	become	clearer	as	we	
proceed	to	discuss	the	probable	range	of	intuitive	understanding.
Why	is	sentence	understanding	a	paradigm	case	 for	pratibhā?	Bhartṛhari,	as	a	
grammarian-philosopher,	recognizes	the	centrality	of	language	in	all	our	theoretical	
and	practical	activities.	In	his	view,	our	experiences	of	daily	life	are	invariably	im-
pregnated	with	words.	However,	 he	 also	 has	 a	 notion	 of	 linguistic	 traces	 and	 of	
	inarticulate	words	 (anākhyeyaśabda).	Bhartṛhari	was	a	Hindu	who	believed	 in	 the	
doctrine	of	rebirth,	and,	for	him,	we	have	all	used	language	a	great	number	of	times	
in	this	and	previous	lives.	Such	linguistic	activities	have	left	in	the	subliminal	con-
sciousness	numerous	linguistic	traces	waiting	to	be	awakened.25	When	certain	traces	
are	awakened,	they	give	rise	to	articulate	and	inarticulate	words	on	the	surface	of	
consciousness.26	It	is	hard	to	tell	what	precisely	Bhartṛhari	takes	inarticulate	words	to	
be.	Yet,	we	know	that	such	words	are	present	in	the	consciousness	of	an	infant	with-
out	language;	they	also	occur	in	an	adult’s	perceptual	awareness	when	the	object	is	
not	yet	attentively	and	determinately	cognized.	He	can	indeed	claim	that	all	aware-
ness	appears	as	if	permeated	by	words.
Thus,	our	comprehension	of	things	in	the	world	can	sometimes	be	broadly	simi-
lar	to	sentence	understanding.	We	may	understand	in	a	flash	a	facial	expression,	a	
perceived	state	of	affairs,	an	abrupt	situation,	or	the	quality	of	a	jewel,	by	virtue	of	
experiencing	a	coherent	meaning	 therein,	while	knowing	what	 to	do	with	 it.	The	
understanding	spontaneously	arises	through	our	tacitly	integrating	the	experienced	
aspects	of	the	object	as	well	as	the	articulate/inarticulate	words	and	their	meanings.	
That	would	be	an	intuitive	understanding	if	it	bears	the	aforementioned	features.
The	 following	verses	 in	 the	VP	 indicate	 the	 functioning,	 significance,	and	 far-
reaching	presence	of	an	intuitive	understanding:
Concerning	what	is	to	be	done,	no	one	can	transgress	that	[intuitive	understanding]	which	
arises	either	directly	from	words	or	through	the	working	of	linguistic	traces.	(2.146)	The	
whole	world	considers	it	to	be	a	reliable	means	of	knowledge	(pramāṇa).	Even	the	ac-
tivities	of	animals	proceed	by	dint	of	it.	(2.147)	Just	as	the	power	to	intoxicate	and	the	
like	appear	spontaneously	in	certain	substances	by	mere	maturity,	likewise	are	intuitive	
understandings	[that	emerge	in	the	consciousness]	of	those	who	have	them.	(2.148)
The	intuitive	understanding	that	arises	directly	 from	words	is	presumably	intuition	
as	sentence	understanding,	which	results	from	the	comprehension	of	audible	words	
in	an	utterance,	whereas	other	types	of	intuitive	understanding	(whatever	they	are)	
occur	 through	 the	working	of	 linguistic	 traces,	which	bring	 forth	 inner	words	 that	
induce	 the	 intuition	 concerned.	 Either	way,	 the	 emerging	 intuitive	 understanding	
typically	gives	one	the	best	guidance	regarding	what	the	appropriate	action	is	to	take	
here	and	now.
Who	causes	infants	to	move	their	speech	organs	to	utter	meaningful	sounds	for	
the	first	 time?	Who	teaches	pigeons	to	build	nests	 for	breeding?	Who	drives	a	rat,	
trained	to	run	a	maze,	to	succeed	in	finding	its	way	out	even	when	blindfolded?	Nei-
ther	human	infants	nor	nonhuman	animals	have	an	articulate	language.	Yet	given	the	
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doctrine	of	rebirth,	they	are,	for	Bhartṛhari,	endowed	with	linguistic	traces	that	help	
to	induce	in	their	mind	an	intuitive	understanding	that	guides	them	in	their	purpo-
sive	activities.	This	might	explain	why	little	children	who	are	learning	a	language	may	
utter	completely	new	sentences	in	a	way	that	surprises	 their	elders.	However,	 this	
idea	 is	 unpersuasive	 to	 those	of	 us	who	have	no	belief	 in	 rebirth,	 and	Bhartṛhari	
would	be	left	nearly	only	with	nature	or	instinct	to	appeal	to	for	explaining	animals’	
spontaneous,	appropriate	activities.27
Meanwhile,	 Bhartṛhari	 highlights	 repeated	 practice	 as	 an	 important	 factor	 for	
the	arising	of	intuitive	understanding.	Our	ability	to	understand	sentences	of	our	na-
tive	language	already	hinges	on	long-term	linguistic	practice	in	early	childhood	and	
thereafter.	Here,	Bhartṛhari	appears	to	take	expert	intuition	to	be	a	form	of	intuitive	
understanding.28	In	VP	1.35,	he	refers	to	an	expert’s	truthful	awareness	of	precious	
stones,	which,	he	says,	is	born	of	practice	but	not	of	inference,	and	cannot	be	com-
municated	to	others.	To	become	a	connoisseur	of	jewelry,	for	example,	one	needs	to	
receive	instruction	and	training	from	jewelry	experts,	together	with	years	of	practice	
in	discerning	different	types	of	jewel.	A	connoisseur’s	intuition	of	a	jewel	for	what	it	
is	arises	from	a	tacit	integration	of	her	verbal	knowledge	of	jewelry,	various	visual	
cues,	and	so	forth;	the	learned	concepts	in	the	knowledge	become	only	subsidiaries	
to	what	she	intuitively	knows,	and	she	may	have	difficulty	in	describing	the	latter.	
Tacit	integration,	as	Polanyi	tells	us,	differs	from	deductive	inference	in	that	inference	
connects	 two	 focal	 items,	 the	premises	and	consequents,	while	 integration	makes	
subsidiaries	bear	on	one	focus.	In	addition,	the	Commentary	on	VP	1.35	states	that	
the	causal	or	constituent	factors	 (pada, hetu)	 for	an	expert’s	intuition	are	subtle	or	
fine-grained	and	cannot	be	explained	to	others.29	In	any	case,	we	can	well	ascribe	to	
Bhartṛhari	the	view	that	an	intuitive	understanding	does	not	arise	from	any	conscious	
use	of	reason.
Of	 course,	 an	 expert’s	 intuition	 generally	 gives	 rise	 to	 an	 intuitive	 judgment	
about	the	object	in	question,	and	she	may	manage	to	say	something	about	the	prob-
able	 reasons	 for	 the	 judgment.	Yet,	 were	 the	 intentional	 content	 and	 immediate	
	causal	factors	of	the	intuition	adequately	describable,	the	content	would	be	transmit-
table.	If	the	content	could	be	transmitted	to	others,	a	novice	would	have	the	intuition	
merely	by	hearing	the	expert’s	words,	which	is	absurd.	Plainly,	everyone	has	to	ac-
quire	intuition	through	repeated	practice.
Both	sentence	understanding	and	expert	 intuition	are	 intellective	 in	character.	
What	 of	 skillful	 and	 practical	 knowing	 such	 as	 knowing	 how	 to	 swim	 or	 knead	
bread?30	Should	we	treat	knowing-how	as	a	kind	of	intuitive	understanding?	The	view	
that	the	content	of	intuitive	understanding	cannot	be	transmitted	to	others	reminds	us	
of	the	story	about	an	old	wheelwright	in	the	Chinese	Daoist	text	Zhuangzi.	This	old	
man	spoke	of	his	know-how	 for	 subtly	chiseling	a	wheel,	which	was	acquired  in 
the hand and felt in the mind	but	could	not	be	put	into	words.	He	complained	that	
he	could	not	impart	his	expertise	to	his	son	and	so	he	said,	“I’ve	gone	along	for	sev-
enty	years	and	at	my	age	I’m	still	chiseling	wheels.”31	In	the	VP,	Bhartṛhari	does	not	
discuss	pratibhā	 in	 relation	 to	skills	and	skillful	knowing,	although	he	does	assert	
that	all	crafts	are	based	on	an	awareness	that	is	linguistic	in	nature,	supposedly	refer-
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ring	 to	 the	prolonged	process	of	acquiring	craft	 skills	wherein	an	apprentice	 tries	
to	comprehend	the	master’s	instructions	and	closely	watch	and	emulate	the	latter’s	
efforts	at	getting	the	work	done.	Now,	a	knowing-how	typically	depends	on	repeated	
practice	and	has	an	ineffable	content	that	cannot	be	transmitted.	Yet,	it	does	not	seem	
to	arise	spontaneously	in	a	flash,	nor	is	it	an	immediate	awareness	of	an	object	for	
the	 intuitive	meaning.	Given	 the	 lack	of	 the	 second	and	 third	 features	delineated	
above,	 it	 is	 advisable	 not	 to	 include	 knowing-how	 under	 the	 notion	 of	 intuitive	
	understanding.
Furthermore,	can	we	count	sense	perception	as	a	form	of	intuitive	understand-
ing?	Although	Bhartṛhari	appears	to	treat	as	cases	of	intuitive	understanding	certain	
supersensory	perceptions	(such	as	those	that	result	from	the	discipline	of	yoga),	the	
VP	does	not	clearly	place	sense	perception	under	the	notion	of	pratibhā.	Indeed,	if	
sense	experiences	are	invariably	impregnated	with	words,	they	might	be	so	concep-
tual	as	to	exclude	any	indescribable	content.	As	we	have	seen,	however,	by	“words”	
Bhartṛhari	may	 include	 inarticulate	words,	which	we	 supposedly	 share	with	 ani-
mals.32	Besides,	even	if	articulate	words	or	verbalizable	concepts	are	always	present	
in	a	human	adult’s	sense	perception,	this	might	well	be	a	contingent	fact	rather	than	
what	is	integral	to	the	perception.
VP	1.53	and	2.7	imply	that	the	percept	in	sense	experience,	like	sentence	mean-
ing,	is	an	indivisible	whole.	According	to	a	passage	in	the	Commentary	on	VP	1.26,	
a	thing	of	interrelated	constituents	first	appears	to	an	awareness	as	a	whole,	but	may	
then	be	deliberately	divided	in	order	to	focus	on	different	constituents;	yet,	for	the	
arising	of	an	intuitive	understanding	that	leads	to	purposeful	activity,	one	needs	to	
unite	the	constituents	and	once	again	comprehend	the	thing	in	its	closely	interrelated	
form.33	It	is	quite	clear	that	for	Bhartṛhari	an	intuitive	understanding	may	occur	in	
sense	experience.
Suppose,	for	example,	a	person	who	is	afraid	of	snakes	suddenly	sees	a	snake	
when	walking	past	a	bush.	The	person	may	at	that	very	moment	understand	the	snake	
in	a	flash	by	virtue	of	experiencing	a	coherent	but	indescribable	meaning	 therein,	
while	knowing	to	step	back	immediately.	This	understanding	arises	from	the	person	
instantly	 integrating	 the	 perceived	 aspects	 of	 the	 snake,	 the	 past	 experiences	 of	
snakes,	and	other	things.	This	would	not	be	very	different	from	the	intuition	a	hungry	
raccoon	may	have	on	seeing	the	snake,	even	though	the	two	intuitions	will	result	in	
very	different	actions.
Nevertheless,	what	 is	 the	 intuitive	meaning	 that	 figures	 in	 such	 sense	 experi-
ences?	The	meaning	is	perhaps	close	to	what	Michael	Dummett	has	chosen	to	call	
“proto-thought.”	 For	Dummett,	 the	 notion	 of	 proto-thought	 serves	 to	 account	 for	
the	 fundamental	 non-sensory	 component	 of	 sense	 perception	 that	we	 share	with	
animals.	A	dog	can	distinguish	between	being	attacked	by	one	hostile	dog	and	by	
several,	yet	we	cannot	seriously	ascribe	to	him	the	thought,	“There	is	only	one	dog	
there.”	The	dog	has	only	proto-thoughts,	which	cannot	be	accurately	expressed	in	
words,	because	they	do	not	have	the	structure	of	verbally	expressed	thoughts.	Where-
as	proto-thought,	unlike	full-fledged	thought,	does	not	have	language	as	its	vehicle	
and	 cannot	 be	 detached	 from	 present	 situations,	 it	may	 enable	 us,	 on	 seeing	 an	
414	 Philosophy	East	&	West
	object,	 immediately	to	recognize	the	object	according	to	its	 type,	say,	as	a	dog,	a	
tree,	et	cetera,	and	may	evoke	specific	behavioral	responses	on	our	part.34
The	 intuitive	meaning	 as	 the	 intentional	 content	 of	 intuitive	 understanding	 is	
presumably	 more	 holistic	 and	 less	 differentiated	 than	 Dummett’s	 proto-thought.	
While	it	is	difficult	to	say	precisely	what	it	is	(after	all,	it	is	indescribable!),	Bhartṛhari	
may	agree	that	neither	does	an	intuitive sense	experience	involve	a	conceptual	judg-
mental	content	that	can	be	verbalized	properly,	nor	is	it	a	non-conceptual	experi-
ence	 that	was	believed	by	 some	Buddhist	 epistemologists	 to	be	alone	capable	of	
manifesting	the	object	as	it	truly	is.	It	seems	to	me	implausible	that,	upon	seeing	a	
snake,	concepts	like	“snake”	or	propositional	thoughts	like	“that	is	a	snake”	would	
always	in	the	first	place	figure	in	one’s	visual	experience.	Instead,	one	may	first	see	
the	creature	meaningfully	 in	the	sense	of	apprehending	its	meaning	of	 the	unitary	
form,	say,	“that-is-a-snake!”	and	act	immediately	without	any	reflection	in	the	mid-
dle.	If	the	experience	involves	a	conceptual	judgment,	one	would	not	act	instantly;	if	
it	were	wholly	non-conceptual,	one	would	not	act	at	all.	In	any	case,	I	concur	that	
our	sense	perception	is	often	loaded	with	concepts.	What	is	suggested	here	is	only	
that	sense	experience	can	in	some	cases	bear	the	previously	mentioned	features	and	
therefore	count	as	a	form	of	intuitive	understanding.
Finally,	while	Bhartṛhari	notes	the	occasional	unreliability	of	sense	perception,	
inference,	and	verbal	testimony,	which	are	regarded	by	many	traditional	Indian	phi-
losophers,	perhaps	even	by	himself,	as	chief	means	of	knowledge,	he	claims	in	VP	
2.147	that	the	whole	world	takes	intuitive	understanding	to	be	reliable.	Such	a	claim	
is	not	groundless.	Even	 if	 the	uttered	sentence	“The	 tea	 is	 tasty”	and	my	resultant	
judgment	that	the	tea	is	tasty	are	both	false,	my	intuitive	understanding	of	the	sen-
tence	is	correct	insofar	as	I	correctly	apprehend	the	meaning	of	the	sentence.	The	
understanding	would	only	be	considered	incorrect	if	I	misunderstand	the	sentence.	
Again,	expert	intuitions	are	penetrative	and	typically	trustworthy.	Moreover,	several	
contemporary	studies	indicate	that	people	tend	to	trust	and	use	their	intuitions	when	
they	are	in	positive	mood	states;	also,	in	many	decision-making	situations,	intuition	
is	considered	more	effective	and	accurate	than	analysis.35	That	said,	Bhartṛhari	does	
not	assert	that	intuitive	understanding	is	infallible,	and	it	seems	advisable	to	take	it	to	
be	connected	with	the	possibility	of	being	mistaken.
Knowing-what
In	the	preceding	section,	we	discussed	the	general	features	and	probable	range	of	
intuitive	understanding	as	pratibhā.	Although	the	understanding	is	not	infallible,	it	is	
considered	generally	correct.	When	correct,	the	understanding	amounts	to	a	mode	
of	knowing.	For	some	reasons,	such	a	knowing,	which	I	have	termed	knowing-what,	
should	be	distinguished	from	both	knowing-that	and	knowing-how.	The	present	sec-
tion	is	meant	to	address	this	issue.
Gilbert	Ryle’s	cerebrated	distinction	between	knowledge-that	and	knowledge-
how,	which	he	presented	in	his	1949	book	The Concept of Mind,	has	recently	been	
debated	among	analytical	philosophers.	Some	thinkers	dismiss	the	distinction	and	
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attempt	to	show	that	knowledge-how	is	indeed	a	species	of	knowledge-that,36	while	
others	 argue	 against	 any	 wholesale	 reduction	 of	 knowledge-how	 to	 knowledge-
that.37	I	cannot	here	explore	this	issue	at	length,	but	merely	make	a	few	preliminary	
points	pertinent	to	my	approach.
(1)	A	semantic	analysis	of	“knowing	how”	sentences	can	indeed	lend	support	to	
the	view	that	knowledge-how	is	a	species	of	knowledge-that.	After	all,	in	many	uses	
of	the	linguistic	form	“know	how	to	F”	(where	F denotes	an	activity),	what	is	ex-
pressed	is	clearly	knowledge-that,	as	when	we	say	“Jim	knows	how	to	go	to	the	park”	
(he	 knows	 that	 the	 route	 is	 such	 and	 such).	However,	 in	 our	 concern	with	 types	
of	knowledge,	we	should	rather	attend	to	the	substantive	message	of	utterances,	not	
the	precise	verbal	formulations	that	are	used.	Ryle	was	originally	concerned	with	the	
message.	If	so,	we	may	construe	the	term	“knowledge-how”	prescriptively	to	mean	
practical	 knowledge,	 roughly	 a	 practical	 ability	 to	 do	 something,	which	 involves	
embodied,	action-centered	and	normally	learned	skills	that	are	developed	through	
actual	bodily	performance.	By	contrast,	the	term	“knowledge-that”	refers	to	factual,	
propositional	knowledge,	roughly	a	true	(dispositional)	belief	that	is	describable	and	
has	an	appropriate	warrant.38
(2)	I	suggest	we	use	the	term	“knowing”	in	the	occurrent	sense,	and	“knowledge”	
in	 the	dispositional	sense.	A	knowing-that	 is	basically	a	 true,	warranted	cognition	
harboring	a	conceptual	thought	that	can	be	articulated	in	the	form	of	a	proposition	
that	tells	how	things	stand.	It	will	then	become	dispositional	as	a	knowledge-that.	A	
knowing-how,	meanwhile,	is	an	agent’s	good	or	successful	manifestation	of	her	prac-
tical	ability	as	knowledge-how.	Here,	a	person	may	be	said	to	know	how	to	F,	yet	be	
unable	to	F	successfully.	Suppose	an	accident	left	a	master	pianist’s	arms	severely	
paralyzed.	For	a	certain	 time	period	she	would	still	have	 the	knowledge-how,	 the	
ability,	to	play	the	piano,	but	would	have	no	knowing-how,	being	now	unable	to	play	
successfully.	In	a	way,	she	both	knows	and	knows	not	how	to	play	the	piano.	The	
point	is	that	she	would	not	lose	her	ability	overnight;	if,	soon	after	the	accident,	her	
paralysis	was	magically	 cured,	her	masterly	 ability	would	again	be	manifested	 in	
actual	musical	performance.
(3)	One	may	have	consciously	accessible	beliefs	about	one’s	knowledge-how,	
yet,	as	the	wheelwright	story	tells,	it	is	difficult	to	clearly	articulate	and	impart	the	
knowledge	proper.	One	may	know	how	to	 ride	a	bicycle	without	any	conceptual	
understanding	of	how	one	maintains	balance.	One	cannot	learn	to	play	bowls	just	by	
reading	a	book	on	the	game;	one	must	practice	it	to	get	the	knack.	There	is	an	inef-
fable	content	in	one’s	knowledge-how.	In	addition,	knowing	how	to	swim	and	know-
ing	 that	 one	 is	 swimming	 are	 plainly	 two	 phenomenologically	 distinct	 episodes.	
Hence,	the	irreducibility	of	knowledge-how	(and	knowing-how).
Now,	one	may	think	that	the	two	types	of	knowing	/knowledge	depicted	above	
are	jointly	exhaustive.	The	duality	between	them	corresponds	to	that	between	theory	
and	practice,	thinking	and	doing,	and	intellect	and	will.	As	with	many	dualities	and	
dichotomies	in	philosophy,	however,	to	challenge	and	bridge	it	can	be	philosophi-
cally	rewarding.	To	begin	with,	Polanyi	has	already	taken	his	tacit	knowing	to	under-
lie	both	knowing-that	and	knowing-how.	Besides,	 I	have	related	above	the	notion	
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of	intuitive	meaning	to	that	of	what-it-is-likeness.	Here,	Earl	Conee	argues	that	know-
ing	what	an	experience	 is	 like	consists	 in	acquaintance	with	 the	experience,	and	
such	knowledge by acquaintance,	which	requires	only	a	maximally	direct	epistemic	
relation	 to	 the	experience,	“constitutes	a	 third	category	of	knowledge,	 irreducible	
to	factual	knowledge	or	knowing	how.”39	Further,	Eva-Maria	Jung	and	Albert	Newen	
very	 recently	 claimed	 that	 the	 Rylean	 dichotomy	 between	 knowledge-that	 and	
knowledge-how	has	to	be	replaced	by	a	theory	that	distinguishes	three	different	for-
mats	of	knowledge:	(1)	propositional,	(2)	practical,	and	(3)	image-like.	Propositional	
and	practical	knowledge,	respectively,	roughly	correspond	to	our	knowing-that	and	
knowing-how,	whereas	image-like	knowledge	is	similar	to	knowing-what	in	that	it	is	
somewhat	unstructured	such	that	its	content	is	only	partially	explicable	by	concepts	
and	their	combinations.40
In	this	essay,	the	type	of	knowing-what	with	which	we	are	concerned	is	a	correct	
intuitive	awareness	about	some	object	that	bears	the	features	delineated	in	the	previ-
ous	section.	Lacking	a	propositional	content,	an	intuitive	awareness	cannot	be	as-
sessed	for	truth,	but	only	correctness	and	its	intentional	content	cannot	be	described	
adequately.	Meanwhile,	a	knowledge-what	would	be	a	dispositional	 trace	that	re-
sults	from	a	knowing-what	awareness.	Now,	a	correct	intuition	as	a	knowing-what	is	
similar	to	a	knowing-that	in	that	it	is	broadly	epistemic	as	it	is	intentionally	directed	
to	some	external	object	and	may	reveal	to	the	knower	certain	aspects	of	reality.	In	
addition,	it	readily	becomes	a	knowing-that	or	a	conceptual	judgment.	However,	it	
differs	from	a	knowing-that	in	that	it	involves	no	explicit	presence	of	concepts	and	is	
not	structured	by	their	composition.	As	a	result,	neither	it	nor	its	intentional	content	
can	properly	be	described;	again,	what	is	thus	known	cannot	be	transmitted	and	has	
to	be	acquired	by	everyone	via	their	own	experiences.
Like	a	knowing-how,	a	correct	intuition	has	an	ineffable	dimension:	its	content	
cannot	be	matched	by	any	list	of	propositions.	It	depends	for	its	arising	on	repeated	
practice	or	nature/instinct.	Yet,	unlike	a	knowing-how,	it	concerns	mainly	the	mind	
and	senses,	not	the	body.	It	is	an	intuitive	understanding	that	comprehends	its	object	
meaningfully,	rather	than	a	successful	manifestation	of	a	skillful	ability	in	bodily	ac-
tions.	Consequently,	one	knows	what	swimming	is	even	if	one	does	not	know	how	
to	swim,	yet	it	takes	nothing	short	of	a	jewelry	connoisseur’s	intuition	to	know	what	
it	is	to	discern	a	genuine	jewel.
Not	being	endowed	with	language	and	conceptual	thought,	animals	are	unable	
to	grasp	propositions.	They	do	not	have	factual	or	propositional	knowledge.	Never-
theless,	rats	in	an	eight-arm	maze	know,	on	the	sight	of	a	red	sign,	which	arm	of	the	
maze	to	enter	for	food,	and	scrub	jays	know	where	to	recover	particular	food	items	
they	previously	cached.	It	is	problematic	to	place	such	types	of	knowing	under	the	
same	umbrella	as	one’s	knowing	how	to	swim	and	chicks’	knowing	how	to	fly.	In	
fact,	we	should	cast	doubts	on	the	joint	exhaustiveness	of	knowing-that	and	knowing-	
how,	and	I	have	sketchily	shown	that	correct	intuitive	understanding	qua	knowing-
what	needs	to	be	distinguished	from	these	two	types	of	knowing.	It	is	also	palpable	
that	the	notion	of	knowing-what	can	help	to	bridge	between	them.41
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Concluding Remarks
I	have	attempted	 to	explicate	Bhartṛhari’s	conception	of	pratibhā	 in	 its	 relation	 to	
the	notions	of	meaning,	understanding,	and	knowing.	A	pratibhā,	we	have	seen,	is	a	
spontaneously	 arising,	 broadly	 word-tinged	 intuitive	 understanding	 about	 some-
thing.	It	is	a	knowing-what	as	well	if	it	correctly	apprehends	an	unstructured	meaning	
of the	thing.	Further,	it	is	not	reducible	to	its	verbal	and	nonverbal	causal	factors	and	
cannot	be	described	adequately.	I	have	tried	to	provide	a	coherent	rational	recon-
struction	of	the	conception,	although	my	reconstruction,	being	largely	constrained	
by	Bhartṛhari’s	laconic	exposition,	remains	incomplete.
Western	philosophers	used	to	 think	that	 the	human	being	is	 the	only	creature	
endowed	with	a	mind	that	thinks	in	terms	of	conceptual	ideas,	and	is	the	only	crea-
ture	that	possesses	an	articulate	language.	It	 is	 the	use	of	language,	as	well	as	the	
exercise	of	rational	thinking,	that	accounts	for	the	intellectual	superiority	of	humans	
over	 animals.	 Polanyi,	 however,	 cautions	 against	 such	 a	 view.	The	 human	 gift	 of	
speech,	he	says,	cannot	itself	be	due	to	the	use	of	language	but	must	be	due	to	some	
pre-linguistic	capacities.	Accordingly,	we	shall	have	to	account	for	the	acquisition	of	
language	in	humans	by	acknowledging	in	them	the	same	kind	of	inarticulate	powers	
as	we	observe	in	animals.42	In	the	meantime,	a	number	of	recent	studies	in	moral	
psychology	suggest	that	people’s	moral	judgments	are	generally	the	result	not	of	a	
process	of	ratiocination	and	reflection	but	of	moral	intuitions.	In	a	review	of	these	
studies,	Jonathan	Haidt	writes:
Rather	than	following	the	ancient	Greeks	in	worshiping	reason,	we	should	instead	look	
for	the	roots	of	human	intelligence,	rationality,	and	virtue	in	what	the	mind	does	best:	
perception,	intuition,	and	other	mental	operations	that	are	quick,	effortless,	and	generally	
quite	accurate.43
While	analysis	and	ratiocination	need	to	be	valued	in	our	search	for	truth	and	know-
ledge,	they	may	have	to	be	supplemented	by	spontaneous	holistic	intuitions.	Here,	
Bhartṛhari’s	conception	offers	us	an	Indian	Grammarian	perspective	on	intuition	that	
should	be	worthy	of	our	consideration.
In	contemporary	scholarship,	intuition	is	often	said	to	occur	quickly	and	effort-
lessly	such	that	only	the	outcome,	but	not	the	process,	is	accessible	to	conscious-
ness.	The	process	is	regarded	as	non-conscious,	whereas	the	outcome	is	an	intuitive	
judgment.	We	saw	that	one	characteristic	feature	of	the	Bhartṛharian	intuition	is	that	
its	intentional	content	is	indescribable:	one	has	an	intuitive	sense	of	what	is	an	ap-
propriate	 response	 to	make	here	and	now,	but	one	cannot	properly	verbalize	 the	
sense	—	not	to	say	the	reasons	for	it.	The	term	“intuitive	judgment”	would	then	be	a	
misnomer	 for	pratibhā.	Such	a	position	is	 indeed	unconventional.	Nevertheless,	 it	
accounts	for	the	 threshold	state	between	the	process	and	the	judgment	and	better	
captures	 the	 immediate,	 not	 yet	 propositionally	 structured	 character	 of	 the	 sud-
denly	arising	intuitive	experience.	(After	all,	it	takes	some	time	for	the	mind	to	form	
a	 judgment!)	The	 intuition,	 further,	 is	 related	 to	 the	notions	of	 knowing-what	 and	
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of	knowing	what	an	experience	is	like.	The	notion	of	knowing-what	gives	us	a	third	
type	of	knowing	aside	from	knowing-that	and	knowing-how.	In	addition,	we	know	
what	it	is	like	to	see	or	hear,	yet	the	nature	of	the	knowing	remains	obscure.44	Over-
all,	 while	more	work	 needs	 to	 be	 done,	 I	 hope	 to	 have	 shown	 the	 relevance	 of	
Bhartṛhari’s	conception	of	pratibhā	for	contemporary	philosophical	studies	of	related	
topics.
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1			–			For	a	critical	edition	of	the	Sanskrit	text	of	the	Vākyapadīya,	see	Rau	1977.	Verse	
numbers	in	the	present	article	are	given	according	to	that	edition.
2			–			Bhartṛhari’s	presentation	of	the	topic	is	laconic	and	requires	hermeneutic	eluci-
dation,	for	which	one	may	refer	to	Subramania	Iyer	1982,	Tola	and	Dragonetti	
1990,	and	Akamatsu	1994.	However,	the	approach	of	these	works	is	more	phil-
ological	than	philosophical.	Readers	may	also	consult	Coward	and	Raja	1990	
for	discussions	of	the	relevant	issues	in	the	Grammarian	school.
3			–			For	relatively	recent	discussions	on	the	related	issues,	see	Aklujkar	2001	and	
Bronkhorst	2001.
4			–			Ogawa	1999,	pp.	276–278;	apart	from	the	verses	cited	therein,	one	may	refer	
to	VP	1.51	and	88	(verses	51	and	88	of	the	first	division	or	Kāṇḍa	of	the	VP ).
5			–			VP	1.51	and	the	Commentary	(the	Vṛtti )	on	it	in	Subramania	Iyer	1966,	p.	109.	
(I	assume	that	Bhartṛhari	 is	 the	author	of	 the	Vṛtti.)	What	I	 take	to	be	the	act 
here	is	called	the	own form	(ātmarūpa)	in	the	verse.	Both	the	act	and	the	inten-
tional	 percept	 (jñeyarūpa)	 are	 immanent	 in	 the	 awareness	 or	 consciousness	
(jñāna).
6			–			The	signifying	word	as	the	own	form	(svarūpa)	of	a	word	is	called	sphoṭa	in	the	
VP,	but	I	shall	bypass	this	notion.
7			–			VP	2.132.	This	verse	states	that	the	intentional	object	is	understood	to	be	the	
meaning	of	a	word	when	it	is	known	as	an	external	object.	In	light	of	VP	2.445	
and	 3.7.6,	 I	 take	 this	 to	 mean	 that	 the	 intentional	 object	 is	 superimposed	
(bāhyīkṛtya, samāropya)	on	the	external	world.	Cf.	Ogawa	1999,	pp.	271–276.	
The	superimposition	serves	for	Bhartṛhari	the	important	function	of	relating	the	
inner	image	to	the	external	world.	Incidentally,	although	Bhartṛhari	gives	other	
different	views	of	word	meaning,	he	seems,	at	least	at	the	conventional	level,	to	
generally	accept	the	present	view.
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8			–			VP	2.445	speaks	of	sentence	meaning	as	of	the	nature	of	awareness	(saṃpratyaya),	
while	VP	2.145	takes	it	to	appear	in	the	form	of	an	object	(viṣaya).	Thus,	the	
meaning	is	an	object	immanent	in	the	awareness	of	sentential	understanding	
and	is	in	this	sense	said	to	be	intentionally immanent.	The	meanings	of	words	
constituting	a	sentence	are	also	intentionally	immanent,	but	they	are	said	to	be	
abstracted	 or	 analyzed	 out	 of	 the	 sentence	meaning,	while	 being	 externally	
imposed.	Cf.	VP	2.445–446.
9			–			To	 save	 space,	 only	my	 translations,	 not	 the	 Sanskrit	 originals	 of	 the	 verses	
quoted	from	the	VP,	are	given.
10			–			David	Pitt	(2004)	has	argued,	I	think	quite	convincingly,	that	conscious	thoughts	
have	proprietary	phenomenal	properties	that	outstrip	any	accompanying	audi-
tory	 or	 visual	 imagery	—	that	what	 it	 is	 like	 to	 think	 a	 conscious	 thought	 (or	
	understand	a	sentence)	is	distinct	from	what	it	is	like	to	think	any	other	con-
scious	thought	(or	understand	any	other	sentence)	and	from	what	it	is	like	to	be	
in	 any	 other	 kind	 of	 conscious	 mental	 state.	Thus,	 there	 is	 something	 it	 is	
uniquely	like	to	apprehend	the	meaning	of	a	sentence.
11			–			See	Pitt	2004,	p.	31.
12			–			It	seems	for	Bhartṛhari	 that	a	thing	is	directly	and	properly	expressible	if	 it	 is	
independent	 in	 the	 sense	of	being	determinately	cognizable	and	 is	qualified	
by	 a	 distinct	 qualifier	 that	 functions	 as	 the	 basis	 for	 the	 application	 of	 the	
word	concerned.	Such	a	thing	is	structured	or	at	least	endowed	with	a	qualifier-
qualificand division.	A	structureless	thing,	by	contrast,	can	only	be	indirectly	
expressed	by	conceptually	imposing	such	a	division	on	it.
13			–			VP	2.425,	439,	441.	The	ineffability	of	relation	is	explained	mainly	in	the	third	
chapter	 of	 the	 third	 division	 of	 the	VP:	 3.3.3–5,	 19;	 see	Houben	 1995,	 pp.	
170–213.	Cf.	Russell	1927,	pp.	275–276,	where	Russell	recognizes	the	unsub-
stantiality	of	relations	and	the	difficulty	of	expressing	them	by	words.	After	high-
lighting	the	ineffability	of	relation,	Bhartṛhari	goes	on	in	VP	3.3.20–24	to	show	
why	one	can,	without	contradiction,	speak	of	something	by	saying	that	it	is	inef-
fable;	for	an	elaboration	of	this	issue,	refer	to	Ho	2006.
14			–			Cf.	VP	2.440,	3.3.54,	3.11.7,	3.14.475.	For	Bhartṛhari,	an	indescribable	thing	
mostly	bears	various	properties	and	capacities,	yet	they	are	so	intimately	inter-
woven	that	the	thing	as	such	is	indivisible.	To	express	it,	one	needs	to	abstract	
from	 it	 a	 distinct	 form	or	 impose	 on	 it	 an	 extraneous	 adjunct	 that	 serves	 to	
qualify	it	and	functions	as	the	basis	concerned.	This	artificially	divided	or	extra-
neously	qualified	thing	is	describable,	but	it	is	not	the	original	thing.	For	exposi-
tion	of	such	ideas,	see	the	Commentary	on	VP	2.440	in	Subramania	Iyer	1983,	
p.	313,	and	Helārāja’s	commentary	(the	Prakīrṇaprakāśa)	on	VP	3.11.7	in	Sub-
ramania	Iyer	1973,	p.	98.
15			–			The	Commentary	on	VP	1.132	asserts	that	when	an	object	freshly	presents	itself	
to	consciousness	without	any	basis	for	the	application	of	words	being	cognized	
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therein,	it	appears	in	an	unspecifiable	(avyapadeśya)	way	as	“it	is	this.”	There	
may	seem	to	be	a	tension	between	this	assertion	and	VP	2.144.	However,	the	
use	 of	 the	 word	 avyapadeśya	 (literally	 meaning	 “indefinable”	 or	 “unspeak-
able”)	here	suggests	otherwise,	and	we	may	take	the	object	—	and	the	intuitive	
meaning	—	to	be	only	indirectly	expressible	by	an	expression	such	as	“it	is	this”	
or	by	a	demonstrative	like	“this.”
16			–			VP	2.145,	419,	444.
17			–			VP	2.234,	425,	442,	446;	3.3.81.
18			–			Polanyi	and	Prosch	1975,	p.	33.
19			–			Polanyi	1958,	p.	57.
20			–			Polanyi	 1958,	 pp.	 62–63,	 87–93;	 Polanyi	 1959,	 pp.	 44–46;	 Polanyi	 1969,	
pp.	123–127,	132.
21			–			Cf.	 Polanyi	 1958,	 pp.	 87–93.	 Polanyi	 states	 on	 p.	 90:	 “by	 acquiring	 a	 skill,	
whether	muscular	or	intellectual,	we	achieve	an	understanding	which	we	can-
not	put	 into	words	and	which	is	continuous	with	 the	 inarticulate	 faculties	of	
animals.”	On	pp.	91–92,	he	takes	one’s	focal	knowledge	of	the	meaning	of	a	
text	to	be	inarticulate	knowledge.
22			–			Cf.	VP	2.7,	25,	and	Tola	and	Dragonetti	1990,	p.	96.
23			–			Modern	scholars	in	the	fields	of	psychology,	philosophy,	and	management	have	
offered	 various	 definitions	 and	 characterizations	 of	 intuition;	 see	 the	 discus-
sions	in	Shirley	and	Langan-Fox	1996	and	Dane	and	Pratt	2009.	Of	course,	I	am	
concerned	mainly	with	the	characterizations	given	in	the	present	article	to	the	
notion	of	pratibhā.
24			–			By	 “intentional	 content”	 I	mean	 the	 ideal	 content	 that	 is	 immanent	 in	 con-
sciousness	as	the	intentional	correlate	of	the	act	of	awareness	concerned,	which	
would,	in	the	case	of	intuitive	understanding,	be	said	to	be	an	intuitive	meaning	
(in	a	rather	stretched	sense	of	the	term	“meaning”).
25			–			VP	1.129–131	and	its	Commentary.
26			–			See	 the	Commentary	 on	VP	 1.129,	 131–132.	 Roughly,	 articulate	words	 are	
	inner,	unspoken	words	that	can	properly	be	articulated	as	audible	words,	while	
inarticulate	words	cannot.	For	Bhartṛhari,	thinking	amounts	to	an	inner	silent	
speech	 that	consists	of	a	 series	of	 such	articulate	words	and	 their	correlated	
meanings.
27			–			Apart	from	words	and	linguistic	traces,	Bhartṛhari,	in	VP	2.152,	lists	nature	and	
training	/practice	among	six	kinds	of	causal	factors	that	help	to	bring	about	an	
intuitive	understanding	 (the	other	 four	 kinds	 are	 somewhat	 exotic).	He	does	
note	that	some	animals	can	be	trained	such	that	hearing	of	specific	sounds	in-
duces	in	them	an	intuitive	understanding	about	what	to	do	in	response	to	the	
sounds;	see	VP	2.117–118	and	the	Commentary	on	VP	1.123.
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28			–			In	the	Commentary	on	VP	2.152,	an	expert	digger’s	intuition	of	where	to	dig	a	
well	is	considered	an	intuitive	understanding	that	results	from	practice.	In	situ-
ations	related	to	expertise,	an	expert	knows,	almost	spontaneously,	what	to	do,	
yet	may	not	be	able	to	explain	the	reasons	for	his	or	her	judgment.
29			–			Polanyi	and	Prosch	1975,	p.	40;	Subramania	Iyer	1966,	p.	93.
30			–			People	may	speak	of	expert	wine	tasters	and	chicken	sexers	as	possessing	spe-
cific	 skills.	One	may	be	 said	 to	possess	 the	 skills	of	understanding	a	certain	
language.	Such	skills	are	intellective	in	the	sense	of	being	correlated	with	dis-
cernment	and	understanding.	However,	here,	I	use	the	notion	of	skill	only	to	
refer	to	embodied,	action-centered,	and	non-intellective	skills	 that	are	devel-
oped	through	actual	bodily	performance,	but	not	to	intellective	skills,	although	
the	borderline	between	the	two	types	of	skills	can	be	somehow	fussy.
31			–			Watson	1968,	p.	153.
32			–			If	 the	notion	of	 inarticulate	words	 seems	unappealing,	we	may	consider	Mi-
chael	Dummett’s	(1994,	p.	125)	notion	of	proto-concept.	While	a	cat	cannot	
have	any	concepts,	properly	so	called,	it	may	possess	proto-concepts,	which	we	
share	with	animals	without	language.	Proto-concepts	constitute	proto-thoughts,	
and	I	shall	soon	discuss	Dummett’s	notion	of	proto-thought.
33			–			Subramania	Iyer	1966,	p.	75.	Subramania	Iyer	(1982,	pp.	54–55)	and	Tola	and	
Dragonetti	(1990,	p.	110)	take	pratibhā	to	occur	in	ordinary	sense	perception,	
although	they	do	not	give	textual	evidence.
34			–			Dummett	1994,	pp.	121–126.	Dummett	contends	 that	 to	attain	an	adequate	
account	of	perception,	we	adult	human	beings	must	be	regarded	as	frequently	
engaging	in	proto-thoughts,	voluntarily	and	involuntarily.
35			–			Dane	and	Pratt	2009,	pp.	12–16.	Surely,	the	Bhartṛharian	intuition	is	only	akin	
to,	but	not	identical	with,	the	intuitions	discussed	in	modern	scholarship.
36			–			See	Stanley	and	Williamson	2001,	Snowdon	2003,	and	Bengson	and	Moffett	
2007.
37			–			For	example,	Noë	2005,	Wallis	2008,	and	Jung	and	Newen	2010.
38			–			No	commitment	need	be	made	here	to	a	particular	kind	of	warrant;	any	will	do	
for	the	present	purposes.
39			–			Conee	1994,	p.	136.
40			–			Jung	and	Newen	2010,	pp.	124–130.	However,	 their	 approach	centers	only	
on	 knowledge	 we	 have	 of	 our	 actions	 and	 is	 therefore	 not	 very	 pertinent	
here.
41			–			If,	 as	 Subramania	 Iyer	 holds	 (1982,	 p.	 54),	pratibhā	 takes	place	all  the  time 
in	us,	it	would	often	remain	only	implicit	and	subconscious,	and	yet	probably	
be	 integral	 to	 knowing-that	 and	 knowing-how.	 I	 shall	 not	 pursue	 this	 issue	
here.
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42			–			Polanyi	1958,	p.	70.
43			–			Haidt	2001,	p.	822.	Intuition	is	here	said	to	be	common	to	all	mammals;	it	is	
reported	that	people	typically	cannot	tell	how	they	really	reached	a	moral	judg-
ment.	Significantly,	Puṇyarāja,	an	ancient	commentator	on	the	VP,	commenting	
on	VP	2.147,	takes	the	manifestation	of	people’s	good	conscience	to	be	an	in-
stance	of	pratibhā;	see	Subramania	Iyer	1983,	p.	66.
44			–			For	the	difficulties	of	classifying	the	knowing	as	knowing-that,	see	Mellor	1993,	
pp.	7–9.	For	some	of	the	difficulties	involved	in	classifying	it	as	knowing-how,	
see	Snowdon	2003,	pp.	22–25.
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